From Pacifism to Defence: Europe’s Defence Capacity and Dual-Use Technologies

Europe’s security architecture is entering one of its most testing periods in decades.

As the war in Ukraine continues and geopolitical tensions sharpen across multiple fronts, the continent is being forced to confront a reality it had long hoped was behind it: security can no longer be taken for granted.

For years, Europe’s defence posture rested on two assumptions. The first was that large-scale war on the continent had become nearly unthinkable. The second was that the United States would remain the ultimate guarantor of European security. Both assumptions now look increasingly fragile.

The return of war to Europe’s neighbourhood, coupled with growing uncertainty about the long-term durability of the transatlantic security umbrella, has triggered a profound reappraisal across the continent. Europe is no longer merely debating how much it should spend on defence. It is also grappling with a deeper question: how does a society that has grown accustomed to peace recover a strategic mindset?

That is not an easy transition. Europe’s post-war political culture was shaped by the trauma of the Second World War and, later, by the relative stability that followed the end of the Cold War. Over time, military risk receded from public consciousness. Defence budgets were cut, armed forces were reduced, and resources were channelled into welfare, development, and economic modernisation. In many European societies, pacifism ceased to be simply an ethical position and became part of the political mainstream.

This legacy still matters. Major European states such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Spain no longer maintain conscription, and decades of strategic demobilisation cannot be reversed overnight. Europe may now be willing to rebuild its military capacity, but physical rearmament is only one part of the challenge. Equally important is a mental and doctrinal shift: moving from a culture of risk aversion to one of preparedness, deterrence, and resilience.

Yet Europe’s path back to strategic seriousness may not lie solely in reviving traditional models of military power. It may instead depend on how effectively it can harness the technologies that increasingly define modern conflict.

Warfare Has Changed — and Europe Must Change With It

The nature of war is being transformed by digital systems, artificial intelligence, data infrastructures, autonomous platforms, and advanced software. Military strength is no longer measured only in tanks, fighter aircraft, or troop numbers. It is increasingly shaped by algorithms, sensors, communications systems, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare tools, and the speed at which innovation can be deployed.

In this new environment, dual-use technologies have become central.

The concept of dual-use is not new. For decades, innovations developed in the military sphere found civilian applications. Many technologies that later became embedded in everyday life emerged from defence-related research. But that flow is now being reversed. Today, the civilian sector is often the true engine of technological innovation, and the military sphere is adapting commercial breakthroughs for strategic use.

This shift has major implications for Europe. It means defence capability no longer depends exclusively on conventional arms manufacturers or state-led military research. It increasingly depends on start-ups, software engineers, data scientists, universities, and civilian research ecosystems. The decisive technologies on today’s battlefield are often not produced in traditional arms factories, but in innovation hubs, laboratories, and tech firms.

That is why Europe’s future defence capacity will be shaped as much by its ability to integrate civilian innovation into strategic planning as by its willingness to increase military spending.

The Strategic Value of Dual-Use Innovation

For Europe, dual-use technologies offer more than just an additional layer of capability. They may provide the fastest and most realistic route to strategic adaptation.

Unlike traditional defence procurement, which is often expensive, slow, and bureaucratic, dual-use innovation can be agile, scalable, and rapidly transferable across sectors. This matters in a security environment where speed increasingly determines effectiveness. Low-cost, adaptable, and intelligent systems can sometimes outperform larger and far more expensive platforms burdened by lengthy procurement cycles.

Examples of this shift are already visible. German firm Quantum Systems develops drones that can serve both civilian and military purposes. Helsing, one of Europe’s most prominent defence-tech companies, has built its model around AI-enabled systems ranging from battlefield software to autonomous capabilities. These are not traditional defence firms in the classical sense, yet they are becoming central to Europe’s security landscape.

This reflects a broader truth about modern war: the most strategically relevant actors are no longer only states and conventional defence contractors. Civilian technology companies now play an increasingly decisive role in shaping military effectiveness.

Europe’s Real Challenge Is Not Only Material — It Is Psychological

There is, however, a deeper issue at stake. Europe’s challenge is not merely technological or industrial. It is psychological.

A continent that spent decades distancing itself from military logic must now rediscover the language of power without abandoning the values that define it. That requires more than new budgets and procurement plans. It requires a cultural shift in how security is understood: not as an outdated preoccupation of the past, but as a necessary condition for political sovereignty and social stability.

In this sense, Europe’s rearmament debate is not simply about building more weapons. It is about rebuilding strategic confidence.

Dual-use technologies are likely to play a crucial role in that process, because they sit at the intersection of innovation, economic strength, and defence capability. They allow Europe to draw on existing technological excellence and convert it into strategic relevance. But even that will not be enough unless Europe also overcomes its long-standing reluctance to think in terms of hard power.

The continent’s transition from passivity to preparedness will depend not only on what it can produce, but on whether it is willing to think differently about security itself.

Europe’s security reckoning has begun. The real question now is whether it can move fast enough — intellectually, politically, and technologically — to meet the demands of a more dangerous world.